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Three days before Christmas 1988, a computer worm was released on a very
large international DECnet network. The worm reproduced itself and was
received on an estimated 6,000 computer nodes worldwide. However, only a
small percentage of these nodes actually executed the program. The
computers that successfully ran the program would try to propagate the worm to
other computer nodes.
The worm was released onto the DECnet Intemet from a computer at a
university in Switzerland. Within 10 minutes after it was released, the worm was
detected on the Space Physics Analysis Network, or SPAN, which is NASA's
largest space and Earth science network. Once the source program for the
worm was captured, a procedural cure, using existing functionality of the
computer operating systems, was quickly devised and distributed. A
combination of existing computer security measures, the quick and accurate
procedures devised to stop copies of the worm from executing, and the network
itself, were used to rapidly provide the cure. These were the main reasons why
the worm executed on such a small percentage of nodes.
The purpose behind the worm was to send an electronic mall message to all
users on the computer system running the worm. The message was a
Christmas greeting and was signed "Father Christmas." This paper presents an
overview of the analysis of the events concerning the worm based on an
investigation that was made by the SPAN Security Team and provides some
insight into future security measures that will be taken to handle computer
worms and viruses that may hit similar networks in the future.
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vINTRODUCTION
The Space Physics Analysis Network, or SPAN [1], has been an extremely
reliable international scientific computer network that has become a major
element in NASA's quick reaction capability for supporting many major NASA
missions over an eight-year period [2]. Major features of SPAN are its ease of
use, efficiency, and availability to scientists conducting research in scientific
disciplines such as astronomy, astrophysics, climate, Earth, ocean, planetary,
life, and solar terrestrial science.
Currently, SPAN ties together well over 2,800 computers at NASA centers,
other government agencies, private companies, and universities in the United
States, with extensions to the European Space Agency's E-SPAN network.
SPAN utilizes computer-to-computer communications (DECnet protocol)
allowing mail, binary file transfer, and remote log-on capability. The majority of
the computers connected to the network are VAX machines running the VMS
operating system. SPAN is managed by the National Space Science Data
Center (NSSDC), located at NASA's Goddard Space Fight Center (GSFC).
SPAN has interconnections with several national and international wide area
networks such as HEPNET, INFN, THEnet, DAN, GEONET, UARSnet, and
ASTRONET. All these networks cooperatively manage unique computer
DECnet addresses. The nodes from all these networks then form one
transparent worldwide network called the DECnet Intemet. The combined total
number of computers reachable over the DECnet Intemet is about 12,000. To
the user, the DECnet Internet operates like one "easy-to-use" network. The
DECnet Internet, on one hand, has solved the problem of transparency
between computers regardless of what DECnet network they are connected to.
On the other hand, the DECnet Intemet provides the connectivity to make one
network's security problem everyone's concern.
On December 22, 1988, at approximately 17:00 EST (eastern standard time), a
computer worm was discovered on SPAN. This worm has been affectionately
"called the "Father Chdstmas Worm." A computer worm is a program that is self-
contained and has the ability to propagate itself across a computer network to
any idle machine. Unlike a virus, a worm does not modify another program. In
the case of the Father Chdstmas Worm, virtually any computer on the DECnet
Internet could have received a copy of the program. However, an individual
computer may not have the system software configuration that would enable it
to execute the program (because of the implementation of certain secudty
precautions).
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview analysis of the events
concerning the Father Christmas Worm, based on an investigation made by the
SPAN Security Team. From this investigation it has been determined that the
worm was released from a computer (node number 20597::) at a university in
Switzerland. Much of this analysis would not have been possible without the
extensive help and assistance of the system manager of node 20597::.
The Father Christmas Worm was designed to travel quickly. Estimates are that
it was copied to over 6,000 computer nodes. However, it is believed to have
executed on only a fraction of those computers.
HOW THE WORM WORKED
The worm program was named HI.COM. The COM file type in VAX/VMS
signifies a command file and is usually written in the DEC command language
(DCL). DCL provides a user with access to operating- and network-level system
functions on a local or a remote host.
Figure 1 provides a graphic overview of how the worm propagated and
executed on other nodes. During execution of the worm, Node A transferred the
worm file (HI.COM) to Node B. Node B was determined by a section of code in
the worm program that randomly generated node numbers and then checked to
see if the node was reachable. Once the transfer of the program was complete
and Node B had the worm, Node A then would try to direct Node B to execute
the HI.COM program.
So long as the worm was executing, it would continue to search out randomly
reachable computers and try to propagate itseff. On the DECnet Intemet,
separate blocks of DECnet addresses are allocated to individual wide area
networks that are not confined to geographic regions. The use of randomly
generated node numbers by the worm program would ensure a worldwide
distribution across many networks, which would increase its survivability.
Node A would try to execute the worm on Node B by one of the following two
methods:
• TASK Object 0 - If a system level program, called TASK Object 0, is installed
in a VAX/VMS computer, it will accept and execute commands from another
computer. In other words, TASK Object 0 allows task-to-task jobs to be run
between two computer systems. In the case of the Father Chdstrnas Worm,
nodes that were following the SPAN security guidelines had TASK Object 0
disabled and were not able to execute the HI.COM file. In addition, nodes that
had disabled TASK Object 0 would also not propagate the worm.
• Username/Password Combination - Another way to direct a remote node to
execute a program (in this case HI.COM) is by providing a legitimate
usemame/password combination for verification by the remote node. The
Father Christmas Worm also tried a usemame/password combination of
DECNET/DECNET. This combination of usemame/password has strongly
been discouraged from use in documentation by the Digital Equipment
Corporation (DEC) and in the SPAN Security Policy and Guidelines document
[3].
In the example shown in Figure 1, Node B had TASK Object 0 installed. Node
A then directed Node B to load HI.COM in memory and, disguising it under the
process name MAIL_178DC, begin execution. The renaming of the process
from HI to MAIL_178DC was done to hide the fact that a foreign program was
executing. Mail processes execute quite frequently on these computer nodes
and are easily missed by a system manager monitoring the system. Once
executing on Node B, the worm deleted the file HI.COM that was stored on the
disk, once again covering its tracks. Next, the worm mailed Node B's welcome
banner to the remote node/account 20597::PHSOLIDE in Switzedancl. This
action provided the initiator of the worm a record of the nodes that were able to
execute the worm program. However, there is no accurate record of the nodes
that received a copy of the worm but did not execute it.
The MAIL_178DC program also went through a sedes of time checks looking
for 1988-12-24-00:00 on the computer clock. If the actual time did not match the
Christmas Eve time, the worm randomly generated a new computer node
number (Node C in Figure 1). If Node C was operationally available over the
network, then the Node B worm networked the HI.COM file from its memory to
the new Node C and asked Node C to execute the program. The cycle then
started all over again.
If the system clock time on Node B (or any node executing the worm) was
greater than 1988-12-24-00:00, the worm created a listing of all the authorized
users on that system and sent a Christmas greeting to all those users. The
Christmas greeting message is shown Figure 2. It is signed by "Father
Christmas." After sending out the Christmas mail message, the worm then
deleted the user list it created and stopped execution.
WORM EVENT TIMELINI :=
On December 22, 1988, at 16:52 EST, the Father Christmas Worm was
released from node 20597:: onto the worldwide DECnet Intemet. The worm
was first noticed at GSFC by John McMahon, systems manager of SPAN node
CSDR, at approximately 17:00 EST, some 10 minutes after it had been
released. After notifying SPAN management and the NASA Science Intemet
Project Office (NSIPO), John also contacted GSFC security to register the
unauthorized access to U.S, Government computers. The worm command
procedure HI.COM was captured at GSFC, as it had been at several other
locations throughout the network, and the task of analyzing it began.
The SPAN Security Team sent massages to all SPAN NASA center managers
warning them about the worm and what action to take to stop it. The SPAN
NASA center managers are responsible for distributing warnings to the remote
SPAN sites that are directly connected to them. Notice was also sent to
HEPNET and THEnet representatives.
NASA personnel at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory sent out a warning mall
message to 20597::SYSTEM on December 22, 1988, at 23:30 EST. The
warning stated that the running of an automated command procedure, like
HI.COM, was not permitted on SPAN. This message was received but not read,
since it was very early in the moming in Switzerland and 20597:: was running
unattended, which is quite common.
The PHSOLIDE account (where the worm started) was again logged into on
December 23, 1988, from 1:58-2:23 EST. During this time, all the mail
messages containing the system banners from the systems which successfully
executed the worm were read and deleted.
The DECnet Internet line linking 20597:: to the rest of the world was
disconnected on December 23, 1988, at approximately 03:41 EST. This link
was scheduled to go down for an upgrade to the circuit. The action had nothing
to do with the worm, but it did isolate an active worm on the large local area
network at the university in Switzedand, where it continued to propagate to the
local university nodes (see next section).
During the early course of trying to stop the worm, several network systems
personnel, on their own initiative, issued procedural patches or cures for the
worm. It is important to note that, unlike some virus situations, no vaccine
software was necessary; a tightening up of existing computer systems secudty
features is all that was needed to prevent a node from executing the Father
Christmas Worm. The patches distributed were easy to descdbe and were
issued by, for example, SPAN, HEPNET, DCA, and the San Diego
Supercomputer Center personnel. The basic elements of all the procedural
patches were:
a) Delete/Disable TASK Object 0
b) Stop Process MAIL_178DC
c) Delete all copies of HI.COM
Many of these patches went out on mailing distribution lists, such as VIRUS-L
over ARPANET (a TCP/IP network). The Father Christmas Worm itself was also
distributed to everyone on the VIRUS-L mailing list (by person or persons
unknown to us). By the end of December 23, the Father Christmas Worm was
virtually stopped on the DECnet Intemet. In general, procedural patches were
reasonably good and provided necessary protection against the Father
Christmas Worm.
Within several days after the worm Incident, the SPAN Security Team received
full cooperation from the systems manager of node 20597::. The systems
manager supplied the team with detailed logs and accounting records from his
system. In February, a detailed report about the Father Christmas Worm was
completed by the SPAN Secudty Team and was turned over to the appropriate
authorities.
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION
After carefully reviewing all of the log-in records to the PHSOLIDE account in
conjunction with the system manager of 20597::, it was concluded that a user
coming through a particular terminal server released the worm program. The
terminal server accesses could have come from one building on the campus or
from existing dial-in modems. The director of the university where node 20597::
is located has had every authorized user of the PHSOLIDE account (15 such
users) sign a non-involvement statement. This affidavit stated that these users
were not responsible for the creation of HI.COM nor were they responsible for
the propagation of the worm onto the network. This action leads the SPAN
Security Team to the conclusion that the account had been compromised by an
unknown individual. Thi_ conclusion is not too difficult to realize, since the
password on the account was the same as the username.
The accounting records also show that on December 23, from 1:58-2:23 EST,
the PHSOLIDE account was logged into again via the terminal server. Once
logged on, this user read and deleted all the computer system banners from the
nodes that returned this information to the 20957::PHSOLIDE account over the
eight-hour period after the worm was released. Even though the actual banners
had been deleted, the network transaction files revealed that 79 nodes sent
their banners to the Switzerland computer. Of the 79, only 27 of these nodes
were on SPAN.
Within an hour after the intruder collected the banners, then deleted them to
cover his tracks, the DECnet line linking this computer to the rest of the DECnet
internet was disconnected for a scheduled maintenance. At this time the worm
was still running on node 20957:: and continued to randomly select new nodes
to propagate to. However, the only nodes available to this active worm were
connected to the local area network at the university. During the next eight
hours, of the 610 nodes on the local university network, the worm executed on
46 computers 90 times, with 15 computer nodes executing multiple versions of
the program.
CLEANUP ACTIVITIER
A follow-up investigation by the SPAN Secudty Team several days after the
worm was released revealed that over three-quarters of the known nodes (79)
that previously executed the worm still had TASK Object 0 accessible as before.
If needed, TASK Object 0 performs an important function by easily allowing the
sharing of peripherals in a local environment. It was obvious that the deletion
of TASK Object 0 from the operating system was not a permanent solution to a
potential security problem. Since then, the SPAN Security Team has provided
these nodes with several altematives from which to chose. These procedures
are outlined in a new release of the SPAN Secudty Policy, Standards, and
Guidelines [3] document.
At the university in Switzerland where the worm was initially released, a report
was written and distributed campus-wide to alert the systems managers of the
security problems they needed to address. Below is a list of the things the
systems manager of node 20597:: insisted would be done campus-wide in
addition to their existing security procedures.
a) There would be no multi-user accounts
b) Passwords would be required for dial-in access (through modems)
c) There would be a restricted user list for dial-in access
d) Additional accounting information would be required for terminal server
access
e) Certain Username/Password combinations would not be allowed
f) A secure solution for providing TASK Object 0 program functionality
would be implemented
it is important to point out that, in addition to the above, the first and most
important practice in providing a rudimentary level of computer security rests
with users, by their choice of passwords. Strict password control should be of
prime importance for everyone on a computer system and its associated
networks. For SPAN nodes, a new software audit system is available that will
provide the system manager with tools to rapidly identify many other security
weaknesses in the system in addition to the ones described above (send mail to
NCF::Sisson for further details).
CONCLUSIOHS
The Father Christmas Worm has over 150 lines of non-trivial control language
code demonstrating a reasonable understanding of VAX/VMS and the DECnet
protocol implementation on DECnet networks. It is obvious from the analysis of
this event that the individual who released the Father Christmas Worm realized
what he or she was doing and carefully returned again to the compromised
node to collect information (system banners) indicating the extent of the worm
on the DECnet Intemet. It is also obvious that the perpetrator expected a large
number of computers to receive and execute the worm, since the worm was
released during the Christmas holiday season when there would have been the
best chance of a worm executing on unattended VAX machines. In addition, it
is typically held by computer hacker groups who make a habit of compromising
the integrity of computer systems that computer systems managers, in general,
do not implement appropriate security procedures and, therefore, are asking for
unauthorized access to occur.
It is estimated that half of the 12,000 DECnet Internet nodes received the worm,
but much less than 2 percent of those computers executed HI.COM within the
first eight hours after the release of the worm. Within minutes after the worm
was released, a very quick user reaction across the DECnet intemet occurred,
and the situation was immediately taken seriously. Once the source program
for the worm was captured, a procedural cure, using existing functionality of the
computer operating systems, was quickly devised and distributed by several
organizations that use the network. A combination of existing computer
security measures, the quick and accurate procedures devised to stop the worm
from executing, and the network itseff were the main reasons the worm
executed on such a small percentage of nodes.
On Friday, January 13, 1989, a worm nearly identical to the Father Christmas
Worm entered the DEC internal network, called Easynet. The private Easynet
network contains more nodes than the DECnet Intemet. However, as discussed
in a recent issue of Digital News [4], according to DEC the worm was spotted as
it entered the network, and the system manager "was able to segregate the
infected system before the worm could spread." It is believed that this Incident
was quickly controlled because of the widespread exposure and experience
gained the previous month with the Father Christmas Worm.
Overall, the impact of the Father Christmas Worm was minimal in an operational
sense but extensive in the area of strengthening compute r system security(an
ongoing activity). A process has been started to formalize procedures that will
deal with worms, viruses, and other violations that threaten the DECnet Intemet
in the future. Key secudty personnel have been identified from each of the
major networks in the DECnet Intemet, and their responsibilities are being
delineated. :
Whatever may be the intention of the authors of computer worms and viruses, if
these threats are not met head on and dealt with rapidly, the ultimate result may
be that they destroy the productive working environment that an open network
provides.
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Figure 1: An overview of the major processes of the "Father Christmas Worm."
In this example, Nodes A and B are executing the worm program HI.COM. Although
Node C has a copy of the worm, it does not execute the program nor does it participate
in the propagation of the worm because it has implemented certain security measures.
From: NODE::Father Christmas
To: You...
Subj: Christmas Card.
24-DEC-1988 00:00
Hi,
How are ya ? I had a hard time preparing all the presents. It isn't quite an easy
job. I'm getting more and more letters from the children every year and it's not
so easy to get the terrible Rambo-Guns, Tanks and Space Ships up here at the
Northpole. But now the good part is coming. Distributing all the presents with
my sleigh and the deers is real fun. When I slide down the chimneys I often find
a little present offered by the children, or even a little Brandy from the father.
(Yeaht) Anyhow the chimneys are getting tighter and tighter every year. I think
rll have to put my diet on again. And after Christmas I've got my big holidays :-).
Now stop computing and have a good time at home !!!!
Merry Christmas and a happy New Year
Your Father Christmas
Figure 2: The "Father Christmas Worm" electronic mail greeting. This message
would only be sent to the users on a system executing the worm if it remained
undetected until December 24, Christmas eve. After this mall message was
sent, the worm program would stop executing.
